New Release Books by Farzana Afridi

Farzana Afridi is the author of Intra-household Decision-making, Child Welfare and Gender in India (2006), Electoral Competition, Accountability and Corruption (2021), What Determines Women's Labor Supply? (2019), Electoral Competition and Corruption (2019) and other 4 books.

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8 results found

Intra-household Decision-making, Child Welfare and Gender in India

release date: Jan 01, 2006

Electoral Competition, Accountability and Corruption

release date: Jan 01, 2021

What Determines Women's Labor Supply?

release date: Jan 01, 2019
What Determines Women's Labor Supply?
We highlight the role of home productivity in explaining the gender gap in labor force participation (LFP), and the non-monotonic relationship of women's LFP with their education in developing countries (India) in contrast to the developed economies (United Kingdom, U.K.). We construct a model of couples' time allocation decisions allowing for both market and home productivity to improve with own education. Our theoretical predictions match the data for India at low levels of women's education but over-predict labor supply at higher levels, unlike the U.K.. Incorporating constraints imposed by social norms regarding the gendered division of labor shows that norms can act as a binding constraint, producing much smaller increases in women's labor supply to market work at higher education levels in transition economies. Our analysis suggests that home productivity, along with social norms regarding couples' time allocation, can be critical determinants of women's labor supply in developing countries.

Electoral Competition and Corruption

release date: Jan 01, 2019

The Ties that Bind Us

release date: Jan 01, 2020
The Ties that Bind Us
We use high frequency worker level productivity data from garment manufacturing units in India to study the effects of caste-based social networks on individual and group productivity when workers are complements in the production function but wages are paid at the individual level. Using exogenous variation in production line composition for almost 35,000 worker-days, we find that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of own caste workers in the line increases daily individual productivity by about 10 percentage points. The lowest performing worker increases her effort by more than 15 percentage points when the production line has a more homogeneous caste composition. Production externalities that impose financial costs due to worker's poor performance on co-workers within her social network can explain our findings. Our results suggest that even in the absence of explicit group-based financial incentives, social networks can be leveraged to improve both worker and group productivity.

Why are Fewer Married Women Joining the Work Force in India? A Decomposition Analysis Over Two Decades

release date: Jan 01, 2016
Why are Fewer Married Women Joining the Work Force in India? A Decomposition Analysis Over Two Decades
Unlike the global trend, India has witnessed a secular decline in women's employment rates over the past few decades. We use parametric and semi-parametric decomposition techniques to show that changes in individual and household attributes fully account for the fall in women's labor force participation rate in 1987-1999 and account for half of the decline in this rate in 1999-2009. Our findings underscore increasing education levels amongst rural married women and the men in their households as the most prominent attributes contributing to this decline. We provide suggestive evidence that a rise in more educated women's returns to home production, relative to their returns in the labor market, may have adversely affected female labor force participation rates in India.

Using Social Connections and Financial Incentives to Solve Coordination Failure

release date: Jan 01, 2020
Using Social Connections and Financial Incentives to Solve Coordination Failure
Production processes are often organized in teams, yet there is limited evidence on whether and how social connections and financial incentives affect productivity in tasks that require coordination among workers. We simulate assembly line production in a lab-in-the-field experiment in which workers exert real effort in a minimum-effort game in teams whose members are either socially connected or unconnected and are paid according to the group output. We find that group output increases by 18%, and coordination improves by 30-39% when workers are socially connected with their co-workers. These findings can plausibly be explained by the higher levels of pro-social motivation between co-workers in socially connected teams.

Hunger and Performance in the Classroom

release date: Jan 01, 2019
Hunger and Performance in the Classroom
Hunger and malnourishment can adversely affect students' performance by lowering their effort and cognition during school hours. We conduct a lab-in-the field experiment, leveraging the extension of India's school meal program from primary to middle grades, to study the effects of school-based supplementary nutrition on students' cognitive effort in the classroom. Using individual level data on the performance of students in a cognitive task both before and after the extension of the program as well as pre and post meal recess on a school day, we find that the provision of meals improved the cognitive performance of students by 13% to 16%. This result is robust to unobserved heterogeneity in school quality and student ability. Our findings suggest that short-term improvements in classroom attention and effort due to school meals can be a mechanism through which longer-term learning outcomes may improve in developing countries.
8 results found


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