New Release Books by Leland Ware

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When painfully shy Peter Butter meets his beastly new teacher Pirate Poultice, his passion for peanut butter spirals out of control and a chain of nutty events unfold. Peanut Butter Boy is a hilariously funny and heartwarming adventure of shy boy versus tyrannical teacher. A side-tickling mystery with a dollop of peanut butter smeared in. 8+years

101 useful tips on how to get the most out of uni life. This is a light-hearted guide highlighting the many unspoken ceremonies, rituals and initiations students can expect to undertake during the time of their course. Tips are arranged into categories covering most aspects of student life: Finance, Academia, Health & Hygiene, Accommodation, Relationships, Drinking, The Student Union, and Graduation.

Highly Anticipated Book Author LeL'Fascod introduces you to one of most brutality honest females you could ever meet. She is a example of a woman who has lived on both sides of the fence and still remains strong. Not because she wanted to but, because she had to. She is a survivor. She proves that looks can be deceiving, from the woman in the suburbs, to the female grinding in the streets. Still one thing remains the same: no matter how you live, or what side of town you live on, money will always be green, and snow will always be white. In this life everyone has to grind to eat.

"Corporate governance can provide mechanisms to effectively monitor the use of derivatives. Using a sample of firms from 34 countries over the period 1990 to 1999, I find that firms with strong governance use currency derivatives for value-maximizing reasons as established by theory. On the other hand, firms with weak governance use such derivatives mostly for managerial self-interests and selective hedging. These results are robust to using a sample of US firms, the use of foreign denominated debt as an alternative strategy to hedge currency risk, selection bias, and a possible endogeneity between hedging policies, corporate governance, and other financial policies. Overall, the results serve as the first comprehensive evidence on the impact of corporate governance on why firms use derivatives and consequently why they hedge"--Federal Reserve Board web site.

"We examine a primary outcome of corporate governance, the ability to identify and terminate poorly performing CEOs, to test the effectiveness of U.S. investor protections in improving the corporate governance of cross-listed firms. We find that firms from weak investor protection regimes that are cross-listed on a major U.S. exchange are more likely to terminate poorly performing CEOs than non-cross-listed firms. Cross-listings on exchanges that do not require the adoption of the most stringent investor protections (OTC, private placements and London listings) are not associated with a higher propensity to shed poorly performing CEOs. Overall, our results provide direct support for the bonding hypothesis of Coffee (1999) and Stulz (1999), and suggest that the functional convergence of legal systems is indeed possible"--Federal Reserve Board web site.

This paper shows that long-term shareholders embed horizon incentives in executive compensation contracts as a mechanism to promote long-term oriented managerial behavior. Increases in long-term institutional ownership lead to longer equity vesting periods measured by CEO pay duration. Further, CEO pay duration decreases following hedge-fund activism that is often argued to be associated with short-term investment horizon. To establish causality, we use institutional mergers as an exogenous change in institutional investor horizon, and to address reverse causality, we use the indexing behavior of institutions. Overall, CEO pay duration is a potential mechanism for institutional investors to align managerial horizon with their investment horizon, and ultimately to influence corporate behavior.

This paper exploits the staggered initiation of takeover laws across countries to examine whether the threat of takeover enhances managerial discipline. We show that following the passage of takeover laws (1) poorly performing firms experience more frequent takeovers; (2) the propensity to replace poorly performing CEOs increases, especially in countries with weak investor protection; and (3) directors of targeted firms are more likely to lose board seats following corporate control events. Our findings suggest that the threat of takeover causes managerial discipline through the incentives that the market for corporate control provides to boards to monitor managers.