New Release Books by Dominik Zaum

In contrast to the common perception that the United Nations is, or should become, a system of collective security, this paper advances the proposition that the UN Security Council embodies a necessarily selective approach. Analysis of its record since 1945 suggests that the Council cannot address all security threats effectively. The reasons for this include not only the veto power of the five permanent members, but also the selectivity of all UN member states: their unwillingness to provide forces for peacekeeping or other purposes except on a case-by-case basis, and their reluctance to involve the Council in certain conflicts to which they are parties, or which they perceive as distant, complex and resistant to outside involvement. The Council�s selectivity is generally seen as a problem, even a threat to its legitimacy. Yet selectivity, which is rooted in prudence and in the UN Charter itself, has some virtues. Acknowledging the necessary limitations within which the Security Council operates, this paper evaluates the Council�s achievements in tackling the problem of war since 1945. In doing so, it sheds light on the division of labour among the Council, regional security bodies and states, and offers a pioneering contribution to public and governmental understanding of the UN�s past, present and future roles.

By looking at the post-conflict international administrations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and East Timor, the book examines how particular ideas about the state, and about the appropriate relationship between the state and its population, have influenced the statebuilding efforts of the international community.

The post-cold war years have witnessed an unprecedented involvement by the United Nations in the domestic affairs of states, to end conflicts and rebuild political and administrative institutions. International administrations established by the UN or Western states have exercised extensive executive, legislative, and judicial authority over post-conflict territories to facilitate institution building and provide for interim governance.This book is a study of the normative framework underlying the international community's statebuilding efforts. Through detailed case studies of policymaking by the international administrations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and East Timor, based on extensive interviews and work in the administrations, the book examines the nature of this normative framework, and highlights how norms shape the institutional choices of statebuilders, the relationship between international and local actors,and the exit strategies of international administrations. The book argues that a particular conception of sovereignty as responsibility has influenced the efforts of international administrations, and shows that their statebuilding activities are informed by the idea that post-conflict territoriesneed to meet certain normative tests before they are considered legitimate internationally. The restructuring of political and administrative practices to help post-conflict territories to meet these tests creates a sovereignty paradox: international administrations compromise one element of sovereignty - the right to self-government - in order to implement domestic reforms to legitimise the authority of local political institutions, and thus strengthen their sovereignty.In the light of the governance and development record of the three international administrations, the book assesses the promises and the pathologies of statebuilding, and develops recommendations to improve their performance.