Most Popular Books by James A. Robinson

Los orígenes del poder, la prosperidad y la pobreza. ¿Qué determina que un país sea rico o pobre? ¿Cómo se explica que, en condiciones similares, en algunos países haya hambrunas y en otros no? ¿Qué papel juega la política en estas cuestiones? Que algunas naciones sean más prósperas que otras, ¿se debe a cuestiones culturales?, ¿a los efectos de la climatología?, ¿a su ubicación geográfica? No, en absoluto. Ninguna cuestión relativa a la prosperidad de un país está relacionada con estos factores, sino proviene de otro mucho más tangible: la política económica que dictaminan sus dirigentes. Son los líderes de cada país, afirman los reconocidos profesores Daron Acemoglu y James A. Robinson en este libro, quienes determinan con sus políticas la prosperidad de su territorio, y así ha ocurrido en todos los períodos de la historia, como demuestran en este apasionante estudio.

Güç, zenginlik ve yoksulluğun kökenleri "Tarih, kaderden ibaret değildir!" Ulusların Düşüşü, tarih boyunca ulusların, özellikle de birbirine benzeyen ulusların ekonomik ve politik gelişmeleri arasında neden büyük farklılıklar olduğuna dair bir tartışma yürütüyor. Yazarlar kısaca "Neden bazı ülkeler zenginken bazıları yoksuldur?" şeklinde bir soru ortaya atıp, köleci toplumlar, feodalizm, sömürgecilik, kapitalizm ve sosyalizm uygulamaları arasında ilginç ve çok öğretici bir yolculuğa çıkıyorlar. Sömürgeler, koloniler, devrimler ve kurtuluş hareketlerinin gölgesi, günümüze nasıl düşüyor... Sanayi Devrimi, neden Moldovya''da değil de İngiltere''de başladı... Kara Ölüm denilen Veba, kralları, lordları, serfleri nasıl etkiledi... Toplumların elitleri ile en alttakiler arasında değişen ve değişmeyen ilişki biçimleri hangileridir... Ulusların Düşüşü, dünyaya bakışınızı ve kavrayışınızı değiştirecek.

Bazı toplumlar özgürken, diğerleri neden otoriter yönetimler altında veya anarşi içinde yaşadılar ve yaşıyorlar? Özgürlük Batı''ya özgü bir durum mu? Özgürlüğün ve demokrasinin akıbeti ne olacak? Daron Acemoğlu ve James A. Robinson''a göre özgürlük "doğal" bir durum değil... Güçlü bir sivil toplum ile güçlü ama prangalanmış bir devletin birbirlerini dengelemesiyle, süreç içinde elde edilen bir kazanım. Bu zor şartlar sağlandığında girilen "dar koridor"da kalmak ise sürekli bir çaba gerektiriyor... Dar Koridor okuru tarihte uzun bir yolculuğa çıkarıp özgürlüğün doğuşu, sürdürülebilirliği ve akıbeti hakkında çarpıcı sonuçlara ulaştırıyor...

"«Chi si allontana dal gruppo è preda del falco» recita un proverbio del popolo ashanti: il mondo è crudele e i forti hanno sempre oppresso i deboli con la violenza. In assenza di un''autorità centrale l''unica protezione è rifugiarsi in una gabbia – spesso opprimente – di norme, tradizioni e alleanze tra clan. Viceversa, uno Stato forte può proteggere gli individui, ma rischia di mutarsi in un mostro, in una dittatura oppressiva. Per gran parte della storia umana, in ogni luogo e tempo, la libertà non è stata qualcosa di scontato e naturale, ma una conquista sofferta ottenuta solo imboccando una vera e propria strettoia. Questo corridoio virtuoso esiste quando i poteri dello Stato e della società sono in equilibrio: quando le istituzioni sono forti, in grado di fornire servizi e far rispettare le leggi; e quando, al tempo stesso, i cittadini hanno la capacità di tenere sotto controllo e chiamare in causa le autorità. La strettoia analizza il modo in cui le nazioni sono riuscite a bilanciare queste due forze in equilibrio precario. Ripercorre la via attraverso cui alcune sono entrate nel corridoio della libertà e altre ne sono rimaste fuori o ne sono dolorosamente uscite. Esplora la storia della democrazia in Grecia, della nascita degli Stati Uniti e di quella delle nazioni create da Maometto e Shaka a partire da terre e popoli divisi. Traccia le origini di un''Europa dai molteplici centri di potere e di una Cina dominata da un''autorità centrale, con i loro percorsi drammaticamente diversi. Indaga le radici del fallimento di molte rivoluzioni nel Medio Oriente e delle speranze per il futuro dell''Africa. Dopo il best seller Perché le nazioni falliscono, Acemoglu e Robinson aggiungono un nuovo tassello fondamentale al loro grande mosaico che ritrae la storia delle società umane. E ci ricordano, oggi più che mai, che la libertà non è dovuta, ma è una vittoria che dipende da un fragile equilibrio di forze, in bilico tra il caos e l''oppressione."

Von den Wirtschaftsnobelpreisträgern 2024 Wie viel Staat muss sein? Nach dem internationalen Bestseller »Warum Nationen scheitern?« widmen sich Starökonom Daron Acemoglu und Harvard-Politologe James A. Robinson in ihrem neuen Buch dieser fundamentalen Frage. Auseinandersetzungen zwischen rivalisierenden Milizen in Libyen, Einschränkung der Presse- und Demonstrationsfreiheit in der Türkei, Umerziehungslager in Nordkorea. Gegenwärtig erleben wir viele Staaten als problematisch: sie sind entweder gescheitert, überreguliert oder despotisch. Aber wie viel Staat ist denn eigentlich notwendig? Die Autoren geben hierauf eine überraschende und provokante Antwort. Anhand zahlreicher historischer und aktueller Beispiele – vom antiken Griechenland über Deutschland im Nationalsozialismus bis zum heutigen China – zeigen sie: Wohlstand, Sicherheit und Freiheit sind in hohem Maße von dem richtigen Rahmen abhängig, in dem der ewige Kampf um Macht zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft ausgetragen wird. Eine überzeugende Analyse, die demonstriert: Ein starker Staat und eine starke Gesellschaft sind kein Widerspruch, sondern bedingen sich gegenseitig.

Sử dụng lịch sử Đông-Tây kim-cổ đã diễn ra trên tất cả các châu lục của trái đất này, hai tác giả lập luận rằng những quốc gia thất bại là những đất nước bị cai trị bởi một nhóm quyền thế tập trung, và những nhóm này đã tổ chức xã hội để phục vụ cho quyền lợi riêng của họ trong khi đại đa số quần chúng nhân dân phải trả giá. Thế lực chính trị bị tập trung trong một nhóm nhỏ, được sử dụng để tạo ra tài sản khổng lồ cho những người nắm giữ quyền lực. Trong khi đó, những nước trở nên giàu có là vì người dân nước đó lật đổ giới quyền thế, những người kiểm soát quyền lực, và tạo ra một xã hội trong đó các quyền chính trị được phân phối rộng rãi, trong đó chính phủ có trách nhiệm giải trình và phải đáp ứng trước công dân, và trong đó đại đa số quần chúng có thể tranh thủ các cơ hội kinh tế. Tóm lại, điều cuốn sách muốn nhắm đến là thể chế nào có những điều chỉnh, cải cách để dung hợp được các lợi ích kinh tế-chính trị và tạo điều kiện cho người dân làm ăn sinh sống được tốt nhất sẽ thành công. Như sách đã chỉ ra, ngay như Trung Quốc, khi họ giải quyết được phần nào đó sự dung hợp này, họ đã có sự tăng trưởng thần kỳ. Và giờ đây họ vẫn tiếp tục giải quyết bài toán thể chế dung hợp của họ.

Inédito no Brasil, O corredor estreito estuda as condições necessárias para que os países vejam o nascimento da liberdade — ou sua extinção. Após o sucesso de Por que as nações fracassam, best-seller do The New York Times, os renomados economistas Daron Acemoglu e James A. Robinson fazem um levantamento das formas que a relação entre sociedade e Estado podem tomar a partir de uma base elementar: a liberdade — ou a ausência dela. No centro de sua teoria, explicam que a liberdade só é mantida por meio de um embate constante entre a população e quem a governa. Se um Estado forte é necessário para conter a violência, impor a ordem, fomentar a prosperidade econômica e oferecer meios para que a população possa seguir os caminhos que escolher, é igualmente importante uma sociedade forte e mobilizada para controlar e limitar os excessos do poder estatal. A liberdade é rara: no jogo de poder que a estabelece, a vontade individual encontra seu limite no outro, e os dois lados precisam ter forças equivalentes para que floresça. Há, porém, exemplos na história em que a tensão dá espaço ao diálogo, e o que antes era um campo de batalha se torna um corredor estreito que tanto a sociedade quanto o Estado podem trilhar em sua cooperação para pavimentá-lo. Em tempos de incertezas e instabilidade — em que o corredor estreito da liberdade corre o risco de se tornar um atalho para a ruína —, a genialidade de Acemoglu e Robinson constrói neste livro os caminhos pelos quais sociedade e Estado podem colaborar para o desenvolvimento mútuo.

Earth has been attacked! In the shadow of the dark forces more powerful than the planet has ever seen, the greatest superhumans have failed. Before all is lost, a new breed of heroes must unite and combat the insidious evil invading the Earth. Who can be trusted?

The classic superhero series Starman, starring a Gen-X superhero, returns in this massive omnibus hardcover edition by James Robinson (Batman: Face the Face) and Tony Harris (Ex Machina). The superheroic legacy of Starman is renewed in these stories, in which Jack Knight--antiques collector and dealer--inherits the name and powers of his father''s old Starman identity from his older brother, who has been assassinated. Reluctantly adjusting to his role, Jack reinvents the look of Starman, ditching the traditional red and green in favor of black leather and aviator goggles. But Jack has inherited more than a heroic identity from his brother...he''s also gained a foe: the beautiful but mentally unbalanced Nash, daughter of the villain known as the Mist. Jack also must come to grips with the Shade, the morally ambiguous former villain who decides to become Jack''s mentor. Collects Starman issues #0-42, Starman Annual: Framing Sequence #1, Starman Annual: The Death of Prince Gavyn #1, Starman Annual: The Witch #1, The Shade #1-4, Starman Secret Files #1 and Power of Shazam #35-36.

Um livro que vai mudar a maneira como você vê e entende o mundo Nesse clássico moderno da economia e das ciências humanas, Daron Acemoglu e James A. Robinson investigam a história de civilizações separadas tanto pelo tempo quanto pela geografia para responder a uma questão que há séculos intriga os estudiosos: por que algumas nações são ricas e outras são pobres? Por meio de uma teoria de base universal, os autores afirmam que as estruturas sociais criadas pelo homem são o que sustenta o sucesso econômico — e o fracasso — das nações. Os países só escapam à pobreza quando dispõem de instituições adequadas, com a preservação do direito à propriedade privada e da livre concorrência. Acemoglu e Robinson defendem, ainda, a tese original de que a probabilidade de os países desenvolverem boas instituições é maior quando contam com um sistema político pluralista e aberto, com disputa de cargos, eleitorado amplo e espaço para a emergência de novos líderes. A partir desses argumentos, demonstram como algumas mudanças podem contribuir para instituições mais plurais, inovações progressistas e êxito econômico, enquanto outras, ao contrário, só estabelecerão mais instituições repressoras e extrativistas que levarão os países à decadência e à estagnação.

"Superman created by Jerry Siegel and Joe Shuster, by special arrangement with the Jerry Siegel family; Batman created by Bob Kane with Bill Finger; Wonder Woman created by William Moulton Marston."

"After a brutal attempt on his life, the Shade leaves Opal City to learn which of the many people he has crossed are responsible. Joining forces with allies such as private detective Will von Hammer and teenaged vampire La Sangre, the Shade begins a centuries-spanning quest that takes him from Australia to Barcelona to London, facing off against lizard gods, celestial pharaohs, and even family members ..."--Page 4 of cover.

Pourquoi certains pays sont-ils riches et d’autres pauvres ? Est-ce dû à la culture, au climat, à la géographie ? Ou est-ce le résultat de l’ignorance des dirigeants politiques ? Acemoglu et Robinson montrent à l’aide de nombreux exemples que ces réponses ne tiennent pas la route. L’histoire et l’analyse économique suggèrent une explication différente : c’est la présence ou l’absence de certaines institutions politiques et économiques qui assurent ou empêchent le progrès vers la prospérité. Des institutions «extractives» – protégeant les intérêts d’une élite puissante au dépens du bien commun – aux institutions «inclusives» – qui posent des limites à influence des puissants, éliminent la discrimination et favorisent l’innovation – le passage est parsemé d’obstacles. Acemoglu et Robinson les analysent en détail, s’appuyant sur un éventail impressionnant d’exemples, tirés de l’histoire de l’Empire romain, des cités-états mayas, de la Venise médiévale, de l’Union soviétique, de l’Amérique latine, de l’Afrique et des pays occidentaux. Ils élaborent ainsi une nouvelle synthèse de l’économie politique d’une pertinence indéniable pour les grands défis politiques et économiques d’aujourd’hui.

Thomas Piketty''s (2013) book, Capital in the 21st Century, follows in the tradition of the great classical economists, like Marx and Ricardo, in formulating general laws of capitalism to diagnose and predict the dynamics of inequality. We argue that general economic laws are unhelpful as a guide to understand the past or predict the future, because they ignore the central role of political and economic institutions, as well as the endogenous evolution of technology, in shaping the distribution of resources in society. We use regression evidence to show that the main economic force emphasized in Piketty''s book, the gap between the interest rate and the growth rate, does not appear to explain historical patterns of inequality (especially, the share of income accruing to the upper tail of the distribution). We then use the histories of inequality of South Africa and Sweden to illustrate that inequality dynamics cannot be understood without embedding economic factors in the context of economic and political institutions, and also that the focus on the share of top incomes can give a misleading characterization of the true nature of inequality. Keywords: Capitalism, Inequality, Institutions. JEL Classification: P16, P48, O20.

This paper documents that the Rise of (Western) Europe between 1500 and 1850 is largely accounted for by the growth of European nations with access to the Atlantic, and especially by those nations that engaged in colonialism and long distance oceanic trade. Moreover, Atlantic ports grew much faster than other West European cities, including Mediterranean ports. Atlantic trade and colonialism affected Europe both directly, and indirectly by inducing institutional changes. In particular, the growth of New World, African, and Asian trade after 1500 strengthened new segments of the commercial bourgeoisie, and enabled these groups to demand, obtain, and sustain changes in institutions to protect their property rights. Furthermore, the most significant institutional changes and consequently the most substantial economic gains occurred in nations where existing institutions placed some checks on the monarchy and particularly limited its control of overseas trading activities, thus enabling new merchants in these countries to benefit from Atlantic trade. Therefore, the Rise of Europe was largely the result of capitalist development driven by the interaction of late medieval institutions and the economic opportunities offered by "Atlantic trade." Keywords: Capitalism, Economic Growth, Institutions, Political Economy, Social Conflict, Trade. JEL Classifications: O10, F10, P10, N13.

We document that rules for leadership succession in ethnic societies that antedate the modern state predict contemporary political regimes; leadership selection by election in indigenous societies is associated with contemporary representative democracy. The basic association, however, is conditioned on the relative strength of the indigenous groups within a country; stronger groups seem to have been able to shape national regime trajectories, weaker groups do not. This finding extends and qualifies a substantive qualitative literature, which has found in local democratic institutions of medieval Europe a positive impulse towards the development of representative democracy. It shows that contemporary regimes are shaped not only by colonial history and European influence; indigenous history also matters. For practitioners, our findings suggest that external reformers'' capacity for regime-building should not be exaggerated.

In this paper we revisit the relationship between institutions, human capital and development. We argue that empirical models that treat institutions and human capital as exogenous are misspecified both because of the usual omitted variable bias problems and because of differential measurement error in these variables, and that this misspecification is at the root of the very large returns of human capital, about 4 to 5 times greater than that implied by micro (Mincerian) estimates, found in some of the previous literature. Using cross-country and cross-regional regressions, we show that when we focus on historically-determined differences in human capital and control for the effect of institutions, the impact of institutions on long-run development is robust, while the estimates of the effect of human capital are much diminished and become consistent with micro estimates. Using historical and cross-country regression evidence, we also show that there is no support for the view that differences in the human capital endowments of early European colonists have been a major factor in the subsequent institutional development of these polities. Keywords: Economic Development, Institutions, Human Capital. JEL Classification: I25, P16, O10.

Why was the Black Death followed by the decline of serfdom in Western Europe but its'' intensification in Eastern Europe? What explains why involvement in Atlantic trade in the Early Modern period was positively correlated with economic growth in Britain but negatively correlated in Spain? Why did frontier expansion in the 19th Century Americas go along with economic growth in the United States and economic decline in Latin America? Why do natural resource booms seem to stimulate growth in some countries, but lead to a ''curse'' in others, and why does foreign aid sometimes seem to encourage, other times impede economic growth? In this paper we argue that the response of economies to shocks or innovations in economic opportunities depends on the nature of institutions. When institutions are strong, new opportunities or windfalls can have positive effects. But when institutions are weak they can have negative effects. We present a simple model to illustrate how comparative statics are conditional on the nature of institutions and show how this perspective helps to unify a large number of historical episodes and empirical studies.

Though models of political economy suggest that changes in political institutions, such as democratization, should have large effects on policies and economic outcomes, the empirical literature finds ambiguous results. It is important, however, to ''unbundle'' democratic reforms into more specific changes, for instance the introduction of secrecy of balloting, and be more specific about the mechanisms linking these to economic outcomes. To this end we develop a simple model of the economic consequences of the absence of a secret ballot. While providing workers with employment, landlords can also impose some degree of political control. When voting is not secret, landlords can dictate who their workers should vote for. As votes are used by the landlords to accumulate political rents, vote control increases the demand for labor and for land. The introduction of secret ballot should lead to a fall in the price of land in those areas where patron-client relationships and vote control were the strongest. We test the predictions of the model by examining in detail the evolution of land prices in Chile around May 31st. 1958, for which we collected original data. A characteristic of rural Chile at this time was the inquilinaje system, by which a worker, the inquilino, entered into a long term, often hereditary, employment relationship with a landlord, and lived on his landlord''s estate. We show that the introduction of the secret ballot in 1958 had implications for land prices which are perfectly consistent with the predictions of our model. Political rents represented 25% of the value of the land in Chile prior to 1958.

In this paper we revisit the relationship between democracy, redistribution and inequality. We first explain the theoretical reasons why democracy is expected to increase redistribution and reduce inequality, and why this expectation may fail to be realized when democracy is captured by the richer segments of the population; when it caters to the preferences of the middle class; or when it opens up disequalizing opportunities to segments of the population previously excluded from such activities, thus exacerbating inequality among a large part of the population. We then survey the existing empirical literature, which is both voluminous and full of contradictory results. We provide new and systematic reduced-form evidence on the dynamic impact of democracy on various outcomes. Our findings indicate that there is a significant and robust effect of democracy on tax revenues as a fraction of GDP, but no robust impact on inequality. We also find that democracy is associated with an increase in secondary schooling and a more rapid structural transformation. Finally, we provide some evidence suggesting that inequality tends to increase after democratization when the economy has already undergone significant structural transformation, when land inequality is high, and when the gap between the middle class and the poor is small. All of these are broadly consistent with a view that is different from the traditional median voter model of democratic redistribution: democracy does not lead to a uniform decline in post-tax inequality, but can result in changes in fiscal redistribution and economic structure that have ambiguous effects on inequality. Keywords: democracy, education, inequality, political development, redistribution, structural transformation. JEL Classification: P16, O10 .

We provide a potential explanation for the absence of, and unwillingness to create, centralized power in the hands of a national state based on the political agenda effect. State centralization induces citizens of different backgrounds, interests, regions or ethnicities to coordinate their demands in the direction of more general-interest public goods, and away from parochial transfers. This political agenda effect raises the effectiveness of citizen demands and induces them to increase their investments in conflict capacity. In the absence of state centralization, citizens do not necessarily band together because of another force, the escalation effect, which refers to the fact that elites from different regions will join forces in response to the citizens doing so. Such escalation might hurt the citizen groups that have already solved their collective action problem (though it will benefit others). Anticipating the interplay of the political agenda and escalation effects, under some parameter configurations, political elites strategically opt for a non-centralized state. We show how the model generates non-monotonic comparative statics in response to the increase in the value or effectiveness of public goods (so that centralized states and public good provision are absent precisely when they are more beneficial for society). We also suggest how the formation of a social democratic party may sometimes induce state centralization (by removing the commitment value of a non-centralized state), and how elites may sometimes prefer partial state centralization.

We document a statistical association between the severity of the persecution and mass murder of Jews (the Holocaust) by the Nazis during World War II and long-run economic and political outcomes within Russia. Cities that experienced the Holocaust most intensely have grown less, and cities as well as administrative districts (oblasts) where the Holocaust had the largest impact have worse economic and political outcomes since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although we cannot rule out the possibility that these statistical relationships are caused by other factors, the overall patterns appear generally robust. We provide evidence on one possible mechanism that we hypothesize may link the Holocaust to the present--the change it induced in the social structure, in particular the size of the middle class, across different regions of Russia. Before World War II, Russian Jews were predominantly in white collar (middle class) occupations and the Holocaust appears to have had a large negative effect on the size of the middle class after the war.

Among countries colonized by European powers during the past 500 years those that were relatively rich in 1500 are now relatively poor. We document this reversal using data on urbanization patterns and population density, which, we argue, proxy for economic prosperity. This reversal is inconsistent with a view that links economic development to geographic factors. According to the geography view, societies that were relatively rich in 1500 should also be relatively rich today. In contrast, the reversal is consistent with the role of institutions in economic development. The expansion of European overseas empires starting in the 15th century led to a major change in the institutions of the societies they colonized. In fact, the European intervention appears to have created an ''institutional reversal'' among these societies, in the sense that Europeans were more likely to introduce institutions encouraging investment in regions that were previously poor. This institutional reversal accounts for the reversal in relative incomes. We provide further support for this view by documenting that the reversal in relative incomes took place during the 19th century, and resulted from societies with good institutions taking advantage of industrialization opportunities.