New Releases by Mark PEARSON

Problems for journalists in interviewing Aborigines; interviewing techniques.

This study examines the sufficiency of U.S. field artillery doctrine and force structure for the conduct of exploitation and pursuit on the airland battlefield. Focus is primarily upon the operational level of war, although salient tactical lessons are investigated as well. An historical analysis of deep offensive campaigns conducted by the Soviet and American armies of World War II, compared and contrasted with the more recent experience of the Israeli Defense Force during the 1973 MidEast War, offers a synthesis of relevant considerations for exploitations and pursuit from battlefields in the past. Next, the study looks to see whether modern-day planners have applied those historical lessons to current and projected U.S. artillery doctrine and force structure. Then, an assessment is offered on the possible impact of technology upon conclusions drawn from the three historical case studies. The study concludes that field artillery organizations and doctrine of the future must emphasize a systemic approach to deep offensive missions. Recommendations include: joint mission analysis of exploitation and pursuit by field artillery and air force agencies; the establishment of fire support coordination centers and conventional artillery reserves at echelons above corps (EAC); considerations of fire support to be held in reserve until counteroffensive actions are initiated; designation of field artillery organizations to be trained especially for the conduct of deep offensive missions; and reconfiguration of divisional artillery organizations. Finally, the author lists those fire support tasks which appear critical to the successful accompaniment of maneuver forces at operational depths.