Best Selling Books by Brian Roe

Even if you''ve never touched a 3D printer, these projects will excite and empower you to learn new skills, extend your current abilities, and awaken your creative impulses. Each project uses a unique combination of electronics, hand assembly techniques, custom 3D-printed parts, and software, while teaching you how to think through and execute your own ideas. Written by the founder of Printrbot, his staff, and veteran DIY authors, this book of projects exemplifies the broad range of highly personalized, limit-pushing project possibilities of 3D printing when combined with affordable electronic components and materials. In Make: 3D Printing Projects, you''ll: Print and assemble a modular lamp that''s suitable for beginners--and quickly gets you incorporating electronics into 3D-printed structures. Learn about RC vehicles by fabricating--and driving--your own sleek, shiny, and fast Inverted Trike. Model a 1950s-style Raygun Pen through a step-by-step primer on how to augment an existing object through rapid prototyping. Fabricate a fully functional, battery-powered screwdriver, while learning how to tear down and reconstruct your own tools. Get hands-on with animatronics by building your own set of life-like mechanical eyes. Make a Raspberry Pi robot that rides a monorail of string, can turn corners, runs its own web server, streams video, and is remote-controlled from your phone. Build and customize a bubble-blowing robot, flower watering contraption, and a DIY camera gimbal.

Using experimental economics, we compare the efficiency and welfare effects of tournaments and fixed performance contracts. Our subjects (agents) were generally better off under fixed performance contracts, but the advantage of the fixed performance contract disappears if the relative magnitude of the standard deviation of the common shock exceeds a critical value. Efficiency wise, agents tend to exert higher effort under fixed performance contracts, on average. Additionally, an increase in the common shock standard deviation appeared to be associated with lower effort under tournaments. Our results shed light on the potential impact of legislative proposals to ban tournament contracts.

Even if you''ve never touched a 3D printer, these projects will excite and empower you to learn new skills, extend your current abilities, and awaken your creative impulses. Each project uses a unique combination of electronics, hand assembly techniques, custom 3D-printed parts, and software, while teaching you how to think through and execute your own ideas. Written by the founder of Printrbot, his staff, and veteran DIY authors, this book of projects exemplifies the broad range of highly personalized, limit-pushing project possibilities of 3D printing when combined with affordable electronic components and materials.

A split-sample design is used to evaluate the convergent validity of three response formats used in conjoint analysis experiments. We investigate whether recoding rating data to rankings and choose-one formats, and recoding ranking data to choose one, result in structural models and welfare estimates that are statistically indistinguishable from estimates based on ranking or choose-one questions. Our results indicate that convergent validity of ratings, ranks, and choose one is not established. In addition, we find that people frequently use ''ties'' in responses to rating questions, and that the option not to choose any of the alternatives (''opt-out'') affects some preference estimates.

A model of vertical product differentiation is used to analyze the labeling of credence goods, focusing on the manner by which quality is communicated. The results indicate that firms prefer private labeling options. In addition, firms may hire private certifiers as well as paying for mandated government labels when the government''s quality benchmark substantially deviates from firms'' private quality choices. The average consumer prefers a mandatory, discrete label with a high-quality standard while poor consumers prefer a mandatory, discrete label with a low standard.

We use economic experiments to investigate how different contract enforcement regimes affect efficiency and the distribution of surplus in a vertically coordinated market with buyer concentration. We find that if a third party (e.g., government) perfectly enforces contracts, social efficiency is enhanced. We also find that when third-party enforcement is imperfect, social efficiency will not necessarily decrease because trading partners find ways to self enforce contracts. However, opportunistic behavior by some traders leaves some sellers (growers) with ex post profits below reservation levels. Finally, partial or one-sided third-party enforcement causes significant efficiency losses by constraining subjects'' ability to use informal enforcement instruments.

Consumers and the food industry can both prevent foodborne illness. Two questions are explored: what is the socially optimal level of preventative effort by each and can tort and regulatory instruments induce such behavior? Analysis is complicated by two aspects of food safety technology: one party''s effort can affect the marginal effectiveness of the other party''s effort and damage functions can be nonconvex. Previous analysis of accidents under torts and regulation fails to consider these generalizations. Indeed, results concerning the ability of tort and regulatory instruments to induce first-best and second-best behavior often contradict previous results in the literature.

We posit a spatially explicit, county-level model of the hog production sector and estimate how numerous firm-specific, locality-specific, and spatial agglomeration factors affect the location, movement, and intensity of hog production within 15 key hog production states. Spatial agglomeration, urban encroachment, input availability, firm productivity, local economy, slaughter access, and regulatory stringency variables affect the sample regions'' spatial organization. Analyses suggest that western states in the sample may shape hog production levels by wielding traditional business recruitment and retention tools (e.g., tax rates, environmental stringency) while Corn Belt states may shape hog production via nontraditional tools (e.g., land use controls).

Increasingly, foods are marketed as “locally grown.” We use stated preference data from a choice-based conjoint instrument to address two issues surrounding consumer demand for locally produced goods: (1) what is the geographical extent of “local,” and (2) is the value consumers place on “local” production distinct from other factors that are often confounded with locally produced foods such as farm size and product freshness? We find our subjects place similar value on products produced “in state” and “nearby” and that consumers'' willingness to pay for local production is independent from values associated with product freshness and farm size.

We estimate willingness to pay (WTP) to operate under two types of contracts--tournaments (Ts) and fixed performance-standard contracts (F). Our results are consistent with the notion that subjects having social preferences for fairness and care about risk. That is, when subjects experience greater inequity under tournaments relative to fixed performance contracts, or experience greater revenue risk under tournaments, the gap between WTP for fixed performance and tournament contracts increases, ceteris paribus. Our results provide an explanation for grower dissatisfaction with tournament compensation schemes independent of possible concerns regarding opportunistic behavior by integrators.