Best Selling Books by Leland Ware

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101 useful tips on how to get the most out of uni life. This is a light-hearted guide highlighting the many unspoken ceremonies, rituals and initiations students can expect to undertake during the time of their course. Tips are arranged into categories covering most aspects of student life: Finance, Academia, Health & Hygiene, Accommodation, Relationships, Drinking, The Student Union, and Graduation.

"Corporate governance can provide mechanisms to effectively monitor the use of derivatives. Using a sample of firms from 34 countries over the period 1990 to 1999, I find that firms with strong governance use currency derivatives for value-maximizing reasons as established by theory. On the other hand, firms with weak governance use such derivatives mostly for managerial self-interests and selective hedging. These results are robust to using a sample of US firms, the use of foreign denominated debt as an alternative strategy to hedge currency risk, selection bias, and a possible endogeneity between hedging policies, corporate governance, and other financial policies. Overall, the results serve as the first comprehensive evidence on the impact of corporate governance on why firms use derivatives and consequently why they hedge"--Federal Reserve Board web site.

"We examine a primary outcome of corporate governance, the ability to identify and terminate poorly performing CEOs, to test the effectiveness of U.S. investor protections in improving the corporate governance of cross-listed firms. We find that firms from weak investor protection regimes that are cross-listed on a major U.S. exchange are more likely to terminate poorly performing CEOs than non-cross-listed firms. Cross-listings on exchanges that do not require the adoption of the most stringent investor protections (OTC, private placements and London listings) are not associated with a higher propensity to shed poorly performing CEOs. Overall, our results provide direct support for the bonding hypothesis of Coffee (1999) and Stulz (1999), and suggest that the functional convergence of legal systems is indeed possible"--Federal Reserve Board web site.

This is a fun way to teach important values to kids which will surely guide them to daily happiness.

This paper shows that long-term shareholders embed horizon incentives in executive compensation contracts as a mechanism to promote long-term oriented managerial behavior. Increases in long-term institutional ownership lead to longer equity vesting periods measured by CEO pay duration. Further, CEO pay duration decreases following hedge-fund activism that is often argued to be associated with short-term investment horizon. To establish causality, we use institutional mergers as an exogenous change in institutional investor horizon, and to address reverse causality, we use the indexing behavior of institutions. Overall, CEO pay duration is a potential mechanism for institutional investors to align managerial horizon with their investment horizon, and ultimately to influence corporate behavior.

This paper examines the effects of say on pay (SoP) laws on CEO compensation, the portion of top management pay captured by CEOs, and firm valuation. Using a large cross-country sample of about 103,000 firm-year observations from 39 countries, we document that compared to our control group of firms, SoP laws are associated with 1) a lower level of CEO compensation, which partly results from lower CEO compensation growth rates and is related to CEO power, 2) a higher pay for performance sensitivity suggesting that SoP laws have the greatest effects on firms with poor performance, 3) a lower portion of total top management pay awarded to CEOs indicating lower pay inequality among top managers and 4) a higher firm value, which is related to whether the CEO''s share of total top management pay was relatively high before the laws are passed. Further, while both mandatory and advisory SoP laws are associated with lower CEO pay levels, only advisory SoP laws tighten the sensitivity of executive pay to firm performance. Collectively, our results document significant changes in executive compensation policies and firm valuation following the passage of SoP laws around the world.

This book has lots of actionable information on how, as a woman, you can unleash the full power of intermittent fasting for weight loss.Struggling to lose weight, and repeatedly failing at it, has to be one of the most soul-crushing things any of us could ever experience especially so for women. Body fat gets packed in different places for both sexes; a man will rarely ever have to struggle with stubborn fat in the upper arms, for instance, while a woman who gains a few pounds will certainly face the prospect of burning upper arm fat that just refuses to go. While men do gain fat in the ''love handles'' area, their case is rarely as bad as that of women. Out there, in the vast universe that is the internet, are countless diets and workout programs targeting belly fat, which is the cause of worry for most men. Comparably, very few programs target the body fat woes of women. Most men can fight body fat using a combination of diet and building lean muscle. Unfortunately, it is harder for women given that muscle gain, lean or not, is not an attractive option for most. In relation to losing body fat, intermittent fasting is revolutionary. It allows its adopter, more so women, to lose stubborn body fat without the usual rigor that comes with ''special diets''. This book will walk you through how, as a woman, you can adopt intermittent fasting to torch fat deposited at various points of the body without gaining any lean muscles.

This paper exploits the staggered initiation of takeover laws across countries to examine whether the threat of takeover enhances managerial discipline. We show that following the passage of takeover laws (1) poorly performing firms experience more frequent takeovers; (2) the propensity to replace poorly performing CEOs increases, especially in countries with weak investor protection; and (3) directors of targeted firms are more likely to lose board seats following corporate control events. Our findings suggest that the threat of takeover causes managerial discipline through the incentives that the market for corporate control provides to boards to monitor managers.

The relationship between the statutory registration of a workforce and impact upon practice and practitioners is unclear. Little empirical research in relation to the efficacy of existing professional registers has been undertaken. No research has so far been undertaken in relation to the impact of UK legislated registration upon social work practice. A number of high profile cases in health care such as the Bristol, Shipman, Ayling and Allit inquiries (DH, 1994; Crown Office, 2001 & 2005) have drawn attention to the inadequacies of workforce registration systems. Regulatory approaches to modifying the behaviours of the regulated are widely viewed as problematic in a broad range of theoretical literature from diverse disciplinary bases and methodologies. Literatures caution that just as ''markets'' may behave imperfectly, so may regulatory mechanisms such as workforce registration systems (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Baldwin, Scott & Hood, 1998; Haines, 1999; Sparrow, 2000; Ashworth & Boyne, 2002; Johnstone & Sarre, 2004; Haines & Gurney, 2004; Walshe & Boyd, 2007). The UK Better Regulation Task Force cautions that some regulatory interventions can make a situation worse (2003b). The potential of professional registers generally and the social work register specifically to impact upon quality and improve protection has been questioned since 1982 when the first meetings about the development of a national social work regulatory council were held (Malherbe, 1982). The regulatory body for social work in England, the General Social Care Council (GSCC) came into being in 2002. The first UK register of social workers came into force in 2005 with protection of title implemented shortly after. The first three conduct cases applying sanctions to registrants were heard within a year of the social work register opening. Using a grounded theory approach, in the context of the first three conduct case outcomes, this study sought to elicit the perceptions of qualified social workers on the positive and negative impact(s) of the statutory requirement to register, for both the individuals and the organisations in which they work. This study finds that the first registration conduct case outcomes triggered a reframing of the concept of conduct and that as a consequence, respondents in this study re-positioned their allegiance to registration, and engagement with conduct matters in the workplace. The study considers the relevance of research findings in the context of a changing policy and political landscape.

This study investigates the role of foreign institutional investors (FIIs) in restraining earnings management activities of firms under varying levels of investor protection. Firms manage their earnings less when independent FIIs are among their shareholders, especially when monitoring is more valuable - in presence of weak investor protection rights and greater growth opportunities. These effects are robust to a quasi-exogenous shock to FIIs'' shareholdings, unobserved firm heterogeneity, and alternative earning management measures. FIIs are associated with an increase in foreign director presence on corporate boards and audit committees.