Best Selling Books by Steven D. Levitt

WARNING: This is not the actual book Think Like a Freak by Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner. Do not buy this if you are looking for a full copy of this book. This is not the actual book, "Think Like a Freak" by Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner. This work is an unofficial guide to Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner'' book "Think Like a Freak." It includes:* Review and Critique of Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner'' book "Think Like a Freak;"* Unofficial summary of main ideas and facts from Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner'' book "Think Like a Freak." In Think Like a Freak, economist Steven Levitt and journalist Stephen Dubner advice how to master the economic way of thinking described in their previous bestsellers. To say it briefly, thinking like a Freak means being willing to think outside the box. The book offers advice, which may be useful to those who want to make better decisions and achieve better results when dealing with minor issues or major worldwide reforms. The kind of thinking, which is promoted in the book, is inspired by the economic approach. The economic approach is both simpler and broader than merely focusing on the economy. It claims to be independent of ideology, and it uses data in order to understand how the world works, how incentives thrive, how resources are distributed, and what prevents people from getting those resources.---------------------Book summaries published by Brief, Concise and to the Point Publishing are designed to keep readers up to date and knowledgeable regarding new and significant books. Book summaries are perfect for people, especially busy professionals, who do not have the time to read books in their entirety. The main benefits of reading book summaries published by Brief, Concise and to the Point Publishing:1. Our book summaries help you save your time and money. Instead of spending days or even weeks reading an important book, simply take one or two hours to read our concise book summary. It will introduce you to the book''s primary content, ideas, arguments and facts. It will also help you decide whether it is worthwhile to invest your time and money in the entire book. 2. Our book summaries are truly comprehensive. Some other publishers'' superficial book summaries do not exceed 15 to 20 pages, although they are presented as lengthy summaries. Our extensive book summaries include all the essential information you need to know.3. Our books help you retain more information pertaining to the book''s content. Academic studies have proven that people retain more of what they read in a summary as compared with what they remember after reading a book. Please note that according to the U.S. copyright law, the ideas and facts presented in books, as well as book titles, are not protected by copyright law.

The number of prisoners incarcerated on drug-related offenses rose fifteen-fold between 1980 and 2000. This paper provides the first systematic empirical analysis of the implications of that dramatic shift in public policy. We show that the increase in drug prisoners led to reductions in expected time served for other crimes, especially for less serious offenses. Reductions in time served, however, increased other crimes by no more than a few percent. Moreover, incarcerating drug offenders is found to be almost as effective in reducing violent and property crime as locking up other types of offenders. We estimate that cocaine prices are 10-15 percent higher today as a consequence of increases in drug punishment since 1985. Based on previous estimates of the price elasticity of demand for cocaine, this implies a reduction in cocaine consumed of as much as 20 percent

In most settings, it is difficult to measure discrimination, and even more challenging to distinguish between competing theories of discrimination (taste-based versus information-based). Using contestant voting behavior on the television game show Weakest Link, one can in principle empirically address both of these questions. On the show, contestants answer questions and vote off other players, competing for a winner-take-all prize. In early rounds, strategic incentives encourage voting for the weakest competitors. In later rounds, the incentives reverse, and the strongest competitors become the logical target. Controlling for other observable characteristics including the number of correct answers thus far, both theories of discrimination predict that in early rounds, excess votes will be made against groups targeted for discrimination. In later rounds, however, taste-based models predict continued excess votes, whereas statistical discrimination predicts fewer votes against the target group. Empirically, I find some evidence of information-based discrimination towards Hispanics (i.e., other players perceive them as having low ability) and taste-based discrimination against older players (i.e., other players treat them with animus). There is little in the data to suggest discrimination against women and Blacks

This paper demonstrates that rising crime rates in cities are correlated with city depopulation. Instrumental variables estimates, using measures of the certainty and severity of a state?s criminal justice system as instruments for city crime rates, imply that the direction of causality runs from crime to urban flight. Using annual city-level panel data, our estimates suggest that each additional reported crime is associated with a one person decline in city residents. There is some evidence that increases in suburban crime tend to keep people in cities, although the magnitude of this effect is small. Analysis of individual-level data from the 1980 census confirms the city-level results and demonstrates that almost all of the crime-related population decline is attributable to increased outmigration rather than a decrease in new arrivals to a city. Those households that leave the city because of crime are much more likely to remain within the SMSA than those leaving the city for other reasons. The migration decisions of high-income households and those with children are much more responsive to changes in crime than other households. Crime-related mobility imposes costs on those who choose to remain in the city through declining property values and a shrinking tax base.

We document and analyze the emergence of a substantial gender gap in mathematics in the early years of schooling using a large, recent, and nationally representative panel of children in the United States. There are no mean differences between boys and girls upon entry to school, but girls lose more than two-tenths of a standard deviation relative to boys over the first six years of school. The ground lost by girls relative to boys is roughly half as large as the black-white test score gap that appears over these same ages. We document the presence of this gender math gap across every strata of society. We explore a wide range of possible explanations in the U.S. data, including less investment by girls in math, low parental expectations, and biased tests, but find little support for any of these theories. Moving to cross-country comparisons, we find that earlier results linking the gender gap in math to measures of gender equality are sensitive to the inclusion of Muslim countries, where in spite of women''s low status, there is little or no gender gap in math.

The minimax argument represents game theory in its most elegant form: simple but with stark predictions. Although some of these predictions have been met with reasonable success in the field, experimental data have generally not provided results close to the theoretical predictions. In a striking study, Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2007) present evidence that potentially resolves this puzzle: both amateur and professional soccer players play nearly exact minimax strategies in laboratory experiments. In this paper, we establish important bounds on these results by examining the behavior of four distinct subject pools: college students, bridge professionals, world-class poker players, who have vast experience with high-stakes randomization in card games, and American professional soccer players. In contrast to Palacios-Huerta and Volij''s results, we find little evidence that real-world experience transfers to the lab in these games--indeed, similar to previous experimental results, all four subject pools provide choices that are generally not close to minimax predictions. We use two additional pieces of evidence to explore why professionals do not perform well in the lab: (1) complementary experimental treatments that pit professionals against preprogrammed computers, and (2) post-experiment questionnaires. The most likely explanation is that these professionals are unable to transfer their skills at randomization from the familiar context of the field to the unfamiliar context of the lab.